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brain-body assumption, and the semantic assumption. It then articulates an alternative, enactive 
approach that considers pain as an embodied response to the situation. This approach entails the 
hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain, which states against the brain-body assumption 
that the intentional character of pain depends on the agent's sociocultural background. The paper then 
proceeds to consider two objections. The first questions the empirical basis of this hypothesis. It is 
argued based on neuroscientific evidence, however, that there is no empirical reason to suppose that the 
first-order experience of pain is immune to sociocultural influences. The second objection argues that the 
mainstream approaches can account for sociocultural influences on pain by drawing on the conceptual 
distinction between narrow and wide content. In response, the semantic conception of pain underpinning 
the proposal is challenged. Pain experience can occur in pre-reflective, affectively reflective, or cognitively 
reflective forms, but the semantic conception at most only applies to the last form. The paper concludes 
that the enactive approach offers a promising alternative framework in philosophy of pain. 
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“The importance of any human function lies in its ability to fulfil the aim of the organism: 
namely, to be, to resist destructive change from within and without. The same is true of the 
person, although existence in this case is exposed to threats very, very different from those to 
which an animal or plant is exposed. In nature, action and reaction affect each other according 
to necessary laws. In the human sphere there is a further factor to be taken into account: the 




Pain was once a paradigm of non-intentional experience. While other forms of sensory experience 
typically exhibit intentionality, it was often claimed that pain is a purely qualitative experience 
contained in itself. The non-intentional conception of pain, however, makes it hard to account for 
some prominent features of pain experience. For instance, pains give us reasons to believe that 
something is wrong with our body; they can also motivate us to take care of our body in certain ways. 
It is unclear why pains can shape our cognition and action in these ways, however, if they were 
meaningless, non-intentional sensations.   
 Accordingly, most agree nowadays that pain experience bears some form of intentionality. At the 
same time, however, pain exhibits a form of intentionality distinct from other modes of sensory 
perception: It does not present us with sensible properties of the environment, such as the red color of 
an apple or the smooth surface of a table, in the same way that sensory experiences like vision or 
tactile perception does. Philosophical accounts of pain, therefore, must be able to provide a 
conception of pain that adequately elucidates its unique form of intentionality. 
Recent philosophical discussion on pain is centered on an ongoing debate between two main 
approaches: Representationalism and imperativism. Representationalism considers pain to be an 
internal representation that indicates that something is the case with one’s body (Tye 1995a, b, 2006; 
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Dretske 1999; Bain 2003; Cutter & Tye 2011). In illustrating this idea, for example, Tye writes: “[A] 
pain in the leg […] is a token sensory experience which represents that something in the leg is 
damaged, something moreover that is painful or hurts” (Tye 1995a, 228). On the other hand, 
imperativism holds that pain is an internal representation that commands that one take some bodily 
action (Klein 2007, 2015; Hall 2008; Martínez 2011; Martínez and Klein 2016). Klein argues, for 
example, that pains convey a command “to protect a certain body part, in a certain way, with a certain 
intensity” (Klein 2015, 69). 
Despite the significant differences, representationalism and imperativism tend to share basic 
assumptions about the intentionality of pain. First, they both assume that pain is an internal 
representation that is realized within one’s brain. Feeling pain is essentially considered to be a matter 
of instantiating a particular neural pattern. For example, Tye writes: “Token experiences, including 
pains, are themselves located in the brain” (Tye 1995a, 228). On the imperativist camp, Martínez 
states that when I cut my finger and feel pain, “I token a state which compels the cut to be no more” 
(2011, 85), while noting that a tokened mental state “is probably a brain state with some biological 
function” (2011, 68). 1 Accordingly, embodied states and responses are deemed to be nothing more 
than external causes and consequences of the internal pain. I will call this the internalist assumption. 
 Second, they assume that the intentional character of a pain is fully determined by the causal-
informational relationship that holds between the brain and the body. Representationalism holds that 
pain considered as internal state carries information about bodily states that cause it under normal 
conditions (e.g., Cutter & Tye 2011). In contrast, imperativism suggests that it carries information 
about embodied actions that it induces under normal conditions (e.g., Martínez 2011). In both cases, it 
is thought that the pain is directed beyond itself towards bodily states or embodied actions thanks to 
these causal-informational relationships and nothing else. Accordingly, environmental factors beyond 
                                                             
1 Tye also writes: “In my view, pains are patterns of active cells occurring in topographically structured 3-D 
arrays to which sentences are attached” (Tye 1995a, 232). Similarly, Dretske holds that pain experiences are 
“exactly in the same category” (1999, 117) as perceptual experiences, which in his account are “identified with 
internal states having properties (e.g., P) that make them awareness, experiences, of the properties (e.g., P) that 
external objects have” (1999, 115). Imperativists tend to be less explicit on this issue, but that they have no issue 
with internalism is fairly clear from their writings. For example, Klein explicitly develops imperativism to 
defend intentionalism about pain, that is, the thesis that the phenomenology of pain is fully explained by the 
intentional content of mental representations (Klein 2007, 2015). 
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brain and body are deemed as irrelevant to the intentional character of pain; they can only play 
external causal roles in relation to pain experience. I will call this the brain-body assumption.  
Third, they are both committed to what is sometimes called “the semantic thesis of intentionality” 
(Hutto 2012, 42-3). The intentionality of pain is understood exclusively in terms of semantic contents 
typically associated to linguistic representations, such as sentences and speech acts. For example, Tye 
writes: “[P]ains have a complex representational structure, one component of which is sentential and 
another map-like” (Tye 1995a, 232, emphasis in original). Klein also points out that representational 
theories of pain “assume that the content of all sensations is akin to the content of declarative 
sentences” (Klein 2007, 518). Rather than abandoning the semantic assumption, however, he models 
pains on “imperative sentences” instead. Similarly, Martínez accounts for pain by comparing it with 
“the simplest platitudes about the way in which imperative sentences work” (2011, 75). I will call this 
the semantic assumption or the sentence model of pain.  
 In this paper, I argue that philosophical theories of pain had better reject these three 
assumptions. Why? Since they are not a priori truths, these assumptions must be accepted or rejected 
depending primarily on how well they accord with the phenomenon they are meant to be about, 
namely, pain experience. I will argue on empirical and phenomenological grounds, however, that the 
three assumptions fail to pass this test.  
 Another aim of the paper is to articulate an enactive approach to pain as an alternative to the 
mainstream approaches. Enactivists approach mind and cognition with an emphasis on embodied 
action (Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007; Gallagher 2017; Hutto and Myin 2017). Perception, for 
example, is not conceptualized as an internal state of representing reality in one’s head. Rather, 
perceptual experience is considered to be a crucial aspect of an agent’s embodied engagement with a 
particular environmental situation. By extension, enactivists would conceive of pain primarily as an 
aspect of the agent’s embodied engagement with the situation.  
 Rather than presenting the critical and the positive arguments in turn, I will develop my case by 
introducing the enactive alternative from the outset. By so doing, I hope to make it clear how the 
existing approaches fail to appreciate the full implication of the embodied nature of pain.  
In the next section, I articulate the enactive proposal that pain consists in embodied and embedded 
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activity. I will introduce the elements of the enactive approach that matter most to the current 
discussion. They consist of the following three theses: (i) Cognition consists in embodied action; (ii) 
Embodied action is embedded in (and coupled to) an environmental context; (iii) Cognition as 
embodied action, therefore, is culturally permeated. Applied to the case of pain, these theses lead to 
the hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain, according to which the intentional character 
of a pain is determined in part by the sociocultural environment in which the individual agent is 
embedded.2  
Section 3 considers an objection to the hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain. The 
objection states that there is not enough empirical reason to assert that sociocultural factors can affect 
the first-order experience of pain itself. In response, I will draw on further evidence from 
neuroscience that contradicts the assumption that sociocultural influences should only work at the 
level of higher-order interpretation. 
Section 4 attends to the semantic assumption by way of responding to a further objection. The 
objection holds that empirical findings concerning the sociocultural influence on pain can be 
accommodated to the mainstream approaches by employing the conceptual distinction between 
narrow and wide content. In response, I will challenge the semantic assumption that underpins this 
objection. Following Geniusas (2017), I suggest that pain can be experienced in three distinct forms: 
pre-reflectively, affectively, and cognitively. I then argue that only cognitively reflective forms of pain 
can be modelled on sentences. 
 
2. Enactive pain and its sociocultural embeddedness 
The objective of this section is to introduce the enactive hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness 
of pain. I start by describing a paradigmatic study about sociocultural influences on pain and pain 
behavior (§2.1). Then, I submit the enactive hypothesis that sociocultural backgrounds can affect not 
only higher-order interpretations, but also the first-order experience of pain itself (§2.2). I will show 
                                                             
2  I primarily discuss the cultural embeddedness of pain in the following, but I would like to use the term 
“sociocultural” to make it clear that the human environment in which we are embedded is not fully captured by 
the concept of culture. For instance, there are structures of our environment that can only be described by using 
social, economical, or political terms. 
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how this specific hypothesis about pain follows from the core thesis of enactivism that cognition 
consists in embodied action. 
 
2.1 Cultural influence on pain: a case study 
Pain researchers in human and social sciences have argued over decades that pain is experienced 
differently depending on the sociocultural background of the individual in pain (Zborowski 1952; 
Lipton and Marbach 1984; Callister 2003). A variety of sociocultural factors, including (but not 
limited to) nationality (Brena et al. 1990; Nayak et al. 2000), ethnicity (Edwards et al. 2001; Green et 
al. 2003), gender (Miller and Newton 2006; Fillingim et al. 2009; Alabas et al. 2012), and religion 
(Rippentrop et al. 2005; Wachholtz et al. 2007), have been suggested to influence how one perceives 
and responds to pain.  
Let us take one research on cultural influence on pain as a case study: Brena et al. (1990) 
demonstrated that low-back pains associated with medically and physically comparable low-back 
conditions induce different behavioral responses in Japanese and American patients. Overall, 
American patients were found to mark significantly higher scores on a behavioral based measure of 
health status, the Sickness Impairment Profile, which indicated that their daily activities were more 
affected by the low-back pain than their Japanese counterparts. “Given similar medical-physical 
findings,” the authors argued, “Japanese low-back pain patients were less psychosocially, 
vocationally, and avocationally impaired than similar American patients” (Brena et al. 1990, 122). 
How should we interpret such results? One tricky question has to with determining what exactly it 
is that underwent the cultural influence. Is it the character of the pain itself or the way in which one 
comprehends the pain that is influenced by the sociocultural environment? Do Japanese and American 
patients respond to comparable pains differently simply because they interpret them differently? Or 
does the difference come from how they experience the pain prior to secondary interpretation?  
Mainstream and enactive approaches suggest clearly distinct answers to these questions. 
Mainstream approaches dictate based on the brain-body assumption that the pain itself is immune to 
sociocultural influences. Thus the sociocultural variation in pain behavior is explained in terms of 
variations in secondary interpretations of pain. The enactive approach, on the other hand, stress that 
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pain experience consists in an embodied response always situated in particular sociocultural 
environments; hence its intentional character may differ depending on the sociocultural features of the 
environment. It is entirely possible in the enactive framework, therefore, that Japanese and American 
patients do not just interpret medically and physiologically comparable pains differently, but even that 
they experience them differently prior to any interpretation. In the next section, I will explain in more 
detail how this conclusion follows from the general enactivist vision of mind and cognition. 
 
2.2 Enactive pain and the hypothesis of sociocultural embeddedness 
The core thesis of the enactive approach always has been that cognition consists in embodied action 
(Varela et al. 1991, 172). Embodied agents must keep acting in the particular environment in which 
they happen to be situated to maintain their existence. Perception and cognition, thus, are not 
computational or intellectual processes that take place inside the head; rather, they are key aspects of 
the embodied activity of living in an environment. This simple but powerful vision has led to the 
emergence of a range of theories that emphasize the role of sensorimotor action and interaction for 
mind and cognition (e.g., Noë 2004; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Colombetti 2014).   
By saying that cognition consists in embodied action, however, Varela et al. (1991) did not just 
claim that cognition depends on individual sensorimotor capacities. Rather, they also meant to 
advance the idea that cognition as embodied action is always coupled with particular environmental 
contexts. In clarifying their notion of embodiment, thus, Varela et al. write: 
 
By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points: first, that cognition depends upon 
the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and 
second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more 
encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context. (Varela et al. 1991, 173, emphasis 
added) 
 
To see what this means, it is important to notice that embodied action is not only a way for us to adapt 
to the situation at hand, but also part of an ongoing process of development through which we adapt 
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better to the more or less invariant environment. The standards of sensorimotor development, 
therefore, are not efficiency or universality simpliciter. Rather, our sensorimotor capacities develop 
progressively to enable us to adapt more efficiently, appropriately and flexibly to the particular 
biological, psychological and cultural environment in which we happen to exist. In other words, 
embodied action is always a process of developing embodied habits, which in turn form the basis of 
future execution of embodied action. 
 On this view, cognition and action is everywhere affected by the sociocultural context. 
Sensorimotor capacities and the kinds of experience they bring about are shaped through a history of 
embodied engagement with the sociocultural environment. We gradually learn to do and experience 
things in certain ways by constantly and repeatedly engaging with other people who already embody 
habitual styles of doing and experiencing things appropriately for their sociocultural community. 
Therefore, it is more the rule than the exception of cognition and experience that they are affected by 
sociocultural factors. In short, from the enactivist standpoint, “Human cognition is not only shaped 
but utterly permeated by the patterned practices in which those practices grow and develop” (Hutto et 
al. forthcoming).  
 As an illustration, consider the case of cultural influences on perception. There is a range of 
scientific evidence showing, for example, that language affects the way people categorize colors (e.g., 
Winawer et al. 2007): People presented with the same objective color can categorize them differently 
depending on their linguistic background. Recent neuroscientific evidence further indicates that the 
scope of linguistic effects is not limited to post-perceptual categorization, but that it extends to the 
color perception itself (Regier and Kay 2009; Thierry et al. 2009). How can this happen if human 
creatures with different sociocultural backgrounds are equipped with more or less the same biological 
capacities for perception. For enactivists, it happens because our perceptual capacities are not only 
determined by our evolutionary background, but are also shaped through the process of enculturation. 
Perceiving is an embodied action embedded in particular sociocultural contexts; hence, embodied 
agents who went through different processes of enculturation can respond differently to the same 
objective environment in perception. 
Let us now consider how these enactive conceptions can be applied to the case of pain. First, in 
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line with the core thesis of enactivism that cognition consists in embodied action, enactivists will 
understand pain primarily in terms of an agent’s embodied response to its situation. Pain, contra the 
internalist assumption, is not a matter of instantiating a particular neural pattern in one’s head. 
Enactivists would consider the experience of feeling pain as a whole-organism activity, which 
typically occurs when the agent happens to be in a noxious situation. 
It is not true if I said that such conception of pain was never entertained in recent philosophical 
discussions. In pointing out the importance of broadening the notion of embodiment beyond 
sensorimotor contingencies, for example, Gallagher insists that “bodily states such as hunger, fatigue, 
and pain” (2017, 151) must not be neglected to account for the lived body that mediates perception. 
Fuchs has already developed this line of thought in relation to the current topic, as he suggests: “Pain 
sensation is the integral reaction of the living being to a peripheral stimulus, for which, undoubtedly, 
the activation of certain neuronal network is necessary” (Fuchs 2017, 51). The implications of such 
thoughts for recent philosophy of pain, however, are yet to be fully clarified. 
Second, in line with the broad conception of embodiment that entails environmental 
embeddedness, pain as embodied response will be considered to be coupled with environmental 
contexts. This does not only mean that feeling pain is a way of adapting to the particular situation in 
which it is embedded. It also means that this embodied activity is a part of a temporally extended 
process where embodied agents learn to adapt better to their environment or where they develop 
embodied habits. It is important to notice that this is not only a matter of becoming more effective at 
responding to threatening objects and physical injuries. We live in a sociocultural environment, where 
social and cultural appropriateness matters just as much as biological considerations. Accordingly, 
human creatures are in some respect better adapted to their environment when they are able to feel 
and cope with pain in line with certain sociocultural expectations. In short, enactivists would think 
that the experience of having pain belongs to the temporally extended process of development, 
habituation and enculturation just as other forms of sensorimotor experience. 
Studies on the cultural influence on pain will then be explained in the same way that the cultural 
influence on perception is explained in the enactive framework. Enactivists would suggest that people 
with different cultural backgrounds can respond to medically and physically comparable pains 
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differently not just because their response is based on different conceptions about pain and pain 
behavior, but because they experience the pain differently in regard to its intentional character: The 
experiences of comparable low-back pains in Japanese and American patients were directed towards 
different kinds of attitudes and actions in virtue of their sociocultural backgrounds.3 This can happen 
because our nociceptive capacities for feeling pain are not exclusively determined through the 
evolutionary history, but are also shaped through the process of enculturation. Pain does not occur in a 
void. It is an embodied, habitual response that takes place in a particular sociocultural context. The 
enactive approach, therefore, leads to the hypothesis that embodied agents that are enculturated 
differently can respond to objectively similar noxious situations differently at the first-order level of 
pain experience.4 
This approach to pain has a theoretical virtue that is lacking in the other mainstream approaches: 
It provides a unifying perspective on natural scientific and social/human scientific approaches to 
pain.5 The brain-body assumption dictates that environmental factors can only have external causal 
relations to pain experience as such. Accordingly, the mainstream approaches can only envisage pain 
experience as a subject of the natural sciences, which investigate its neural and bodily underpinnings. 
The enactive approach, on the other hand, conceives of pain experience as being both embodied and 
embedded. The intentional character of pain experience is determined jointly by neural, bodily, and 
environmental factors. Accordingly, it is necessary to coordinate both naturalistic and humanistic 
approaches to understand its underlying mechanism and develop a better method of intervention. In 
                                                             
3. Determining which aspects of the two cultures account for the difference is a tricky issue. Brena et al. (1990) 
speculates that Japanese patients might be responding to low back pains the way they do because of “the 
traditional stoicism” characteristic of oriental societies or because of the quantity of “psychosocial support for a 
chronic pain patient” available in the society (123). Such question can only be resolved empirically, and hence 
the current proposal is not committed to any specific answer. 
4. It has been suggested by one of the reviewers that proponents of the mainstream approaches might draw on 
the notion of “cognitive penetration” to account for sociocultural effects on pain experience. To my knowledge, 
no one has attempted so far to develop representationalist or imperativist accounts of pain in this direction, but I 
believe this will be a fruitful enterprise for the proponents of this view. In the end, however, I am not convinced 
that this will allow them to accommodate the sociocultural embeddedness of pain.  A full treatment of the issue 
lies beyond the scope of this paper, but briefly, the reason for this doubt has to do with the nature of 
sociocultural backgrounds. On a standard definition, ‘cognitive penetration’ is a phenomenon in which cognitive 
states (such as beliefs, desires, and intentions) affect the content of perceptual experience (Macpherson 2012; 
Stokes 2013). But an individual’s sociocultural background is not exhausted by a network of cognitive states 
(Searle 1983; Dreyfus 2012). Accordingly, I find it unlikely for the effect of the sociocultural background on 
pain to be fully explained in terms of cognitive penetration.    
5. For more discussion, see Geniusas (2017). 
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short, pain is treated both as a natural and a sociocultural phenomenon in the scientific disciplines 
taken as a whole. That it is able to do justice to this fact is a virtue of the enactive approach, which 
makes a prima facie reason to prefer it to the mainstream approaches. 
 
3. Is the experience itself immune to sociocultural influence? 
One question that can be immediately raised against the enactive hypothesis of the sociocultural 
embeddedness of pain concerns the methodological limit of behavioral studies. It must be admitted 
that most studies on sociocultural influences on pain concern self-reports and behavioral responses, 
rather than the subjective experience as such. The example of low-back pain discussed above is not an 
exception. Why must we then believe that sociocultural factors can affect the first-order experience 
itself, rather than just affecting higher-order interpretations of pain that inform and guide ensuing 
pain-related behaviors? 
There is a range of neuroscientific evidence, however, that works in favor of the enactive 
hypothesis—not unlike how it was the case for color perception. For example, Wiech et al. (2008) 
investigated the effects of religious faith on pain. They compared behavioral and neural responses to 
painful electrical stimulation between a group of practicing Catholics (religious subjects) and a group 
of atheists and agnostics (non-religious subjects). In the religious condition, the electrical stimulation 
was administered alongside an image with religious significance (“Vergine annunciate” by 
Sassoferrato). In the non-religious condition, it was administered with an image without religious 
connotations (“Lady with Ermine” by Leonardo da Vinci). The behavioral data consisted of subjective 
ratings of the intensity of the stimulation. Under the religious condition, the religious group, but not 
the non-religious group, gave significantly lower subjective ratings. Under the non-religious 
condition,  there was no significant difference in the ratings. At the same time, the neuroimaging data 
confirmed that the brains of the religious subjects showed specific activation in the right ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) when presented with the religious image. 
What do these results suggest? It is here important to note that right VLPFC is known from 
studies on placebo effects to be implicated in top-down cognitive modulation of the experience of 
pain (Wager et al. 2004; Tracey and Mantyh 2007). Placebo treatments, according to these studies, 
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bring about analgesic effects by altering expectations about the upcoming pain, which are 
underpinned by an increased activity in the right VLPFC (though not only in this brain region, see 
Scott et al. 2007). Based on these earlier findings, Wiech et al. (2008) argues that the religious 
subjects gave lower ratings to the intensity of the stimulation because they expected some pain relief 
from the presence of the religious image and this expectation changed the activity of brain regions 
responsible for the experience of pain. In other words, the suggestion is that religious backgrounds 
can affect an individual brain’s responsiveness to noxious situations in such a way as to transform the 
first-order experience of pain.  
Although this work is specifically focused on religious contexts, there is no reason to think that 
such effects are specific to religious aspects of the sociocultural background. One might indicate, 
however, that there is a tension between this conclusion and how the authors of this study understand 
their findings. According to Wiech et al. (2008), their “findings suggest that, in certain contexts, at 
least some religious believers can modulate their experience of pain and that such analgesic effects 
might be based on cognitive reappraisal of the negative emotional impact of pain via activity in the 
right VLPFC” (Wiech et al. 2008, 475, emphasis added). Taken at face value, this suggests that the 
cultural transformation of pain took place at the level of higher-order interpretation of its meaning: 
The religious subjects experienced the pain under the religious condition the same way they did under 
the non-religious condition (and as the non-religious subjects did under both conditions). But they 
rated the subjective intensity differently because they interpreted the meaning (“the negative 
emotional impact”) of the pain differently depending on the religious significance of the situation.  
Does this mean that the study does not actually support the enactive hypothesis that pain depends 
on sociocultural contexts at the level of first-order experience? There are two reasons to reject this 
suspicion. The first reason has to do with a terminological issue. It is not uncommon in pain science to 
describe pain itself as a form of interpretation. For example, here is how an eminent researcher in pain 
science defines pain: “Pain is a conscious experience, an interpretation of the nociceptive input 
influenced by memories, emotional, pathological, genetic, and cognitive factors” (Tracey and Mantyh 
2007, 377, emphasis added). On this terminology, interpretation is built into first-order experience. In 
fact, it is just another (somewhat misleading) way of saying that pain is already intentional or 
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meaningful without relying on further cognition. By saying that the pain experience is modulated by a 
“cognitive reappraisal” underpinned by activity in the right VLPFC, therefore, it is unlikely that the 
authors of the current study are indicating that the first-order experience of the religious subjects 
remains constant under the religious and non-religious conditions. 
The second reason concerns the already noted fact that neural activities in the right VLPFC are 
implicated in placebo effects. Placebo effects are conditioned by the subject’s expectation about the 
analgesic effect of the placebo treatment. However, this does not mean that it only affects the 
character of one’s expectation of pain, leaving the expected pain experience itself untouched. Many 
agree that individuals under placebo conditions do not just interpret their pain less severely, but that 
they so experience it in the first place (Wager et al. 2004). At the brain level, there is much support to 
“the concept that prefrontal mechanisms [underpinning higher-order expectations] can trigger opioid 
release within the brainstem during expectancy to influence the descending pain modulatory system 
and subsequently modulate pain perception”(Tracey and Mantyh 2007, 382, emphasis added). I am 
not aware of any study that directly investigates whether religious contexts can alter the neural 
activity of endogenous opioid systems, that is, brain regions known to alter their activity both during 
opioid and placebo analgesia (Petrovic et al. 2002). The final verdict as to whether the religious 
background can alter pain experience as such, therefore, depends on future empirical research. Given 
the current state of knowledge, however, it is more consistent with the findings about placebo effects 
to interpret the religious effects on behavioral and neural responses identified by Wiech et al. (2008) 
as suggesting differences at the level of first-order experience of pain, rather than higher-order 
interpretations about it.6 
 
4. Can pains be modelled on sentences? 
Suppose we have agreed that pain is not immune to sociocultural influences even at the level of first-
                                                             
6. Ongaro and Ward (2017) advances an enactive account of placebo effects, which is congruent with the 
enactive approach to pain advanced in this paper. On their account, placebo treatments can induce changes both 
in attentional and (even surprisingly) in somatic states, or they “afford healing” (522), because of “the meaning 
we perceive them to have in virtue of our history of enculturated embodied interaction, and the fact that being 
intentionally directed towards a meaningful structure in the environment is a bodily and affective relation that 
entrains specific somatic and attentional patterns” (527). 
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order experience; sociocultural factors can affect pain at the level of experience prior to any secondary 
interpretation of its meaning. Does this mean that we have now agreed to give up the brain-body 
assumption concerning the intentional character of pain as well? Not necessarily. One might think it 
possible to accept that pain experience is susceptible to sociocultural effects and still insist that there 
is a sense in which its intentional character is determined independently of these environmental 
factors. 
This thought can be developed by elaborating the sentence model of pain: What a sentence means 
is not simply determined by its composing elements, but rather depends in part on background 
contexts. Even simple sentences such as, “The cat is on the mat,” can mean different things depending 
on the situational context in which they are uttered and understood (Searle 1983, 145). However, 
many think it possible—although not entirely uncontroversial—to distinguish the context-free, narrow 
meaning and the context-dependent, wide meaning of a sentence. The narrow meaning of a sentence 
is determined exclusively by its components, while the wide meaning is determined by the 
combination of the narrow meaning and the context. By so thinking, it becomes possible to 
understand why sentences like “The cat is on the mat,” can mean different things depending on the 
context, while there also is a sense in which they retain the same meaning across different cases of 
application.  
One might then object to the hypothesis of sociocultural embeddedness by asking: Why cannot 
we apply the same distinction to explain the intentional character of pain? In fact, this proposal 
appears to achieve a nice compromise between the brain-body assumption and the sociocultural 
embeddedness hypothesis that follows from the enactive approach. On this hybrid account, the narrow 
meaning of a pain is determined exclusively by the information relationship between the brain and the 
body, but its wide meaning that characterizes the overall experience of pain also depends in part on 
the sociocultural context. Comparable low-back pains in Japanese and American patients, thus, have 
comparable intentional characters in the narrow sense, which may be elaborated either in 
representationalist or imperativist terms. Their overall experience of the pain, however, differs in their 
intentional character because of their different sociocultural backgrounds. 
Enactivists, however, are not in a position to accept this compromise, which is still married to the 
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internalist assumption and hence entails that feeling pain is in essence a matter of instantiating a 
particular brain state. The enactive approach conceives of pain experience to be a kind of embodied 
response to a situation. In other words, this approach is externalist not only about the intentional 
character of pain, but also about the vehicle of the experience of feeling pain. Just as we cannot flick a 
fly without using our body, on this view, we cannot feel pain without putting our body in use. The 
compromise position, in contrast, accepts a form of “content externalism” about the intentional 
character of pain, without conceding the “vehicle internalism” characteristic of the mainstream 
philosophical approaches. But is there any independent reason to think that the compromise cannot be 
sustained—that is, any reason that does not appeal to the analysis that it is incompatible with the 
enactive approach? 
There are two reasons to resist the comparison between pain and sentence and thus the 
explanation of the intentional character of pain in terms of narrow and wide contents. The first reason 
has to do with the compositional character of sentences. We can ascribe context-independent, narrow 
contents to sentences, despite the context-dependent character of their overall meaning, only because 
they are composed of discrete elements, i.e., individual words, which are supposed to preserve their 
semantic value across different contexts. However, there is no obvious sense in which pains are 
composed of such context-independent meaningful elements.  
Proponents of representational or imperative theories might respond that we can think of 
phenomenal features of pain, such as its location (L), quality (Q), and intensity (I), as the context-
independent elements in question. A representationalist might say, for example, that a pain expresses 
with these features indicative contents of the form: Body part (B) has some kind of disorder (D) in 
some degree of severity (S), where B, D, S are each represented by L, Q, I (see e.g., Bain 2003). An 
imperativist might say, in contrast, that these features express an imperative content of the form: Keep 
body part (B) from undergoing some event (E) with some level of priority (P), where B, E, P are each 
expressed in L, Q, I (see e.g., Klein 2015). Then one might suggest that these constitute the narrow 
contents of pain, which contribute to the wide content of the overall experience of pain embedded in 
certain sociocultural situations. 
Now I will not deny that we probably can develop analyses of pain in these directions. In my 
This is a pre-print of an article published in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. The final authenticated 
version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09630-9 
 16 
view, however, such analyses are already informed by the assumption that pains and sentences have 
comparable internal structures. Accordingly, they appear to be self-serving reconstructions of the 
phenomenon at issue, rather than genuine analyses of its structure. The best way to justify this is 
probably by presenting an alternative analysis that is more congruent with the phenomenon of interest. 
This brings me to the second reason for resisting the comparison between pains and sentences. 
The second reason in question has to do with the diversity of the ways in which we experience 
pain. Understanding a sentence is a type of activity with an act-object structure. When we understand 
a sentence, it cannot but figure in our experience as a coherent object that expresses some meaning. 
The experience of feeling pain sometimes takes a similar form. For example, we can experience a 
low-back pain as a sign of injury or fatigue in the low-back, that is, as an object of awareness that 
expresses a meaningful content having to with the state of the body. To this extent, certainly, it is not 
entirely groundless to consider pain to be structurally comparable to sentences. It is important to 
notice, however, that this is not the only form in which pain experience can take place.  
Saulius Geniusas argues based on a phenomenological analysis, “pain is a stratified phenomenon 
that affects the embodied subject and that unfolds on three different levels of experience” (Geniusas 
2017, 346, emphasis in original).  The first level is that of pre-reflective experience (Geniusas 2017, 
337-8). Suppose you couldn’t concentrate on your work because of a low-back pain you have been 
having since morning. At some point of the day, you may have your attention drawn to the pain; you 
may even reflectively observe the pain in an attempt to understand what is going on in your body. 
Although the pain becomes the object of your attention only after this act of reflection, it is clear that 
the pain has not only been experienced, but has also been shaping your perception and action since 
before this reflective act takes place. In general, it seems that we can only reflect on experiences that 
were already in place prior to the reflective act. Accordingly, pre-reflective experience is arguably the 
primary form in which we experience pain.7 
The second level is that of affective reflection (Geniusas 2017, 339-40). This form of pain 
experience typically occurs with severe cases of chronic pain. Unlike in the first level, in this form of 
                                                             
7. See also Sartre (2003) who discusses this idea of pain prior to reflective act illustrating it with the famous 
example of the sore eye (331-9).  
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pain experience, the pain stops guiding and shaping the patient’s action; it simply leaves her with 
nothing but suffering. It does not affect her experience partially, such as by compromising her 
productivity in work, but by making it extremely difficult even to just continue her ordinary life. 
Frederik Buytendijk aptly describes the extreme character of this form of pain experience by denoting 
it as “the greatest pathos of chronic pain” (Buytendijk 1961, 130). In such a predicament, he says, 
“[w]e are surrendered to [the pain] without any means of defense, so utterly abandoned that we are no 
longer able to reach an equal footing with our pain, to respond by some act or purposeful expressive 
movement.  We can only be ‘brave’ and resist collapse or tears when our pain impels us to ‘capitulate’ 
before ourselves” (Buytendijk 1961, 131). Finally, the third level is that of cognitive reflection 
(Geniusas 2017, 340-1). In this form of pain experience, the pain is experienced as an object that 
expresses certain meaningful contents.  
Given this phenomenological analysis, it is clear that the analogy between pain and sentence only 
applies to the cognitively reflective form of pain experience. Accordingly, the conceptual distinction 
between narrow and wide content, when applied to explain the intentionality of pain, fails to do 
justice to the pre-reflective and affectively reflective forms of pain experience, where the pain is not 
experienced as an object expressing some meaningful content. 
The phenomenological analysis of the three levels or forms of pain experience does not only 
allow us to diffuse the objection from narrow and wide content. It also offers diagnoses to the 
mainstream philosophical theories of pain: In light of the current analysis, the fundamental problem of 
representationalism lies in its narrow focus on the cognitively reflective form of pain experience. The 
representational conception of pain as an object of awareness that indicates that something is the case 
with one’s body surely has some footing in this form of experience. Given the stratified character of 
pain, however, we cannot assume that this conception plausibly applies to all kinds of pain. In 
contrast, imperativists emphasize the direct motivational link between pain and embodied action. The 
primary character of pain, according to imperativism, lies in its ability to motivate and guide actions 
without calling on any reflective deliberation. Accordingly, we can see imperativists as being more 
focused on the pre-reflective form of pain experience. Imperativists, however, fail to see that the 
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analogy between pain and sentence no longer holds good at this level of pain experience.8  
How would the enactive approach account for the three forms of pain experience? For enactivists, 
they correspond to three distinct modes of embodied engagement with painful situations. The default 
mode of engagement is pre-reflective: Most of our embodied actions are unmediated by reflective 
deliberations. In the context of such engagements, pain occur to guide embodied actions without 
posing threat to the pre-reflective body-environment coupling. My low-back pain, for example, may 
make me change my posture without making me stop working on my laptop—or even without making 
me notice that I have changed my posture. These pre-reflective engagements may transform into 
cognitively reflective ones: We can start to do things by thinking reflectively about the situation or 
even our own body. In these modes of embodied engagement, pain can (though not necessarily) be 
experienced in the cognitively reflective form. If my low-back becomes overtired after long hours of 
writing, for example, the pain may develop its intensity such that my attention becomes strongly 
drawn to it. This will result in my experiencing the pain cognitively as a sensation telling me that my 
low-back is getting dangerously stiff or that I must stretch my back immediately. Sometimes, 
embodied engagements are not only transformed or interrupted, but almost disrupted by a strong 
affective tone. This is clearly visible in states of anxiety and depression, but it can also happen in 
relation to severe pain both of pathological and non-pathological kinds. For example, a severe 
headache may not just interrupt your daily activities in this or that aspect, but paralyze you as a whole 
making you unable to navigate the day at all. In these modes of engagement (or dis-engagement), pain 
is experienced in the affectively reflective form.  
Determining how best to conceptualize these different modes of embodied engagement, as well as 
how they involve different forms of pain experience, is a task that cannot be completed in the current 
article. What I hope is clear is that there is no in-principle difficulty for the enactive approach to 
accommodate the phenomenological analysis which highlights the diverse forms of pain experience. 
Embodied engagement with the environment can unfold pre-reflectively or  reflectively, and it can 
break down because of the affective state of the body. Accordingly, it is naturally expected from the 
enactive standpoint that pain experience should occur in these different forms. 
                                                             
8 For more discussion, see Miyahara “Coping with pain and obeying commands” (under review). 
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The mainstream approaches in philosophy of pain, representationalism and imperativism, share three 
theoretical assumptions, namely, the internalist assumption, the brain-body assumption, and the 
semantic assumption. I have argued that these assumptions should be rejected. The problem with the 
internalist and the brain-body assumptions concern the implication that environmental factors only 
play external causal role in relation to pain experience. This view is in tension not only with empirical 
studies in the human and social sciences that illuminate different forms of sociocultural effects on 
pain (§2), but also with neuroscientific evidence for the same effect (§3). The problem with the 
semantic assumption concerns the fact that it compares the experience of feeling pain with that of 
comprehending sentences. This comparison turns out to be defective in face of Geniusas’ 
phenomenological study that clarifies how pain experience can take three different forms. At best, the 
semantic assumption applies only to the cognitively-reflective form of pain experience (§4). 
 I have also articulated an enactive approach to pain as an alternative. In opposition to the 
internalist assumption, the enactive approach conceives of pain as an aspect of embodied 
engagements with the situation (§2). In opposition to the brain-body assumption, it holds that the 
intentional character of pain is determined in part by the sociocultural background of the agent – a 
view I called the hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain (§2) In opposition to the 
semantic assumption, it stops modeling pain on sentences. In fact, it refrains from reducing the 
intentionality of pain to any one specific form of intentionality. Rather, it proposes to make sense of 
the diverse forms of pain experience in terms of the diverse forms of embodied engagement (§4).   
Admittedly, there is much more to be said and considered both to elaborate the critical assessment 
of the theoretical assumptions of the mainstream approaches and to develop the alternative, enactive 
approach to pain. But I hope enough has been said to demonstrate the necessity of a more thorough 
examination of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of pain and also to prepare the ground for 
a more full-fledged treatment of the topic from the enactivist perspective.  
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